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Engineering Software
under Statistical
Quality Control
Richard H. Cobb and Harlan D. Mills, Software Engineering Technology

S

ociety has been developing softThecosbof
ware for less than one human gencontinuingto develop
eration. We have accomplished a
failure-lden 8offws1ye great deal in this first generation when
compared to the accomplishments of
with its associated other
disciplines:During the first generalow prductivity are tion of civil engineering,the right triangle
unaamptable. hadn't been invented; accountants did
not discover doubleentry concepts in the
C1-rearly generations of their field.
englneeri~promises Yet despite such significant progress,
lower costs and softwaredevelopment practices need improvement. We must solve such problems
improved qualit~c as
execution failures, which exist to the
extent that software failures are accepted
as normal by most people,
projects that are late and/or over budget, and
the labor-intensivenature of software
development - productivity increases
have been modest since the introduction
of Cobol.
And at the same time we are having diffi-
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culty producing reliable software there is
a demand for even more complex, larger
software systems.
These problems are symptoms of a p r e
cess that is not yet under intellectual control. An activity is under intellectual control when the people performing it use a
theoretically sound process that gives
each of them a high probability of obtaining a commonlyaccepted correct answer.
When most endeavors begin, they are
out of intellectual control. Intellectual
control is achieved when theories are developed, implementation practices are refined, and people are taught the process.
A good example is long division. For
many generations, performing division
with Roman numerals was error-prone.
Today, children who learn how to do long
division with Arabic numerals obtain the
correct answer most of the time. The long
division algorithm is:
1. If the division is not complete, invent
(estimate) the next digit.
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2. Verifythe invention (estimate)made
in step 1.
3. If the verification is correct and the
division is not complete, repeat step 1 for
the next digit; if the verificationis not correct, repeat step 1 for the same digit by
adjustingthe invention.
This is a powerful algorithm for estab
lishing intellectual control. A difficult
problem, which on the surface seems to
require a large invention, has been divided into a series of smaller problems,
each requiring a smaller invention. Most
important, each inventive step is followed
immediately by a verification step to a p
praise the invention’scorrectness, so s u b
sequent inventions don’t build on incorrect results.
This algorithm also applies to software
design and development. As software
technologists strive to find better ways to
develop software,we believe that they are
hindered by some widely accepted beliefs
about how to develop software.We believe
that if we adopt new perspectives about
these development myths, we will open
the way to development practices that will
permit the construction of software that
contains few, if any, latent failures.
We have used new perspectivesto derive
Cleanroom engineering practices. Cleanroom engineering develops software
under statistical qualitycontrol by
specifymg statistical usage,
defining an incremental pipeline for
software construction that permits statistical testing, and
separating development and testing
(onlytesters compile and execute the software being developed).
These practices have been demonstrated to provide higher quality software
- software with fewer latent execution
failures. These same engineering practices also have been observed to improve
productivity. Table 1 summarizes some
quality and productivity metrics for proj-
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ects using some or all of these new softwaredevelopment practices.

Software myths
Myth: Softwarefailures are unavoidable.
This myth holds that software always
contains latent execution failures that will
be found by users. Therefore, we must
learn to live with and manage around software failures.
Fact: Like other engineering activities,
engineering software is a human activity
subject to human fallibilities.Yet other engineering disciplineshave learned how to
design large and complex products with a
low probability that the designs contain

Ekperience to date
supports our belief that
as software developers
move from today’s
heuristic proglamming
to rigwous somvare
englneering, quality
will increase and costs
will decrease.
faults that will cause latent execution failures. When structural engineers design a
bridge there is a high expectation that the
bridge, when built, will not fall down.
In other engineering disciplines,design
failures are neither anticipated nor accepted as normal. When a failure h a p
pens, major investigationsare undertaken
to determine why it occurred. Other engineering professions have minimized
error by developing a sound, theoretical
base on which to build design practices.
But because software developersexpect
and accept design failures, software users
cannot have the same high expectations
as users of other products. We believe this

is because software developers rely on an
incomplete theory, so their engineering
practicesdon’twork.
Software engineers should be required
to use engineering practices that produce
software that does not contain faults that
cause latent execution failures. Users
want the same high assurance that software will work according to its specification that they have for products designed
by other engineers.
The software profession is young, so we
might want to start with modest goals,
such as: Design and implement a 100,000
line system so, more often than not, no
execution failure will be detected during
the software’sentire field life.
Even this modest goal is beyond our expectations using the development practices we now rely on. We believe such a
goal is well within our capabilitiesifwe use
the ideas summarized in this article. For
example, the software for the IBM Wheelwriter typewriter, developed using some
of these ideas, has been in use for more
than six years with millions of users and
n o software failure has ever been reported.’

Myth: Qualily costs m m q
Many people believe that software designed to execute with no or few failures
costs more per line of code to produce.
Fact: Failures and cost are positively correlated. It is more expensive to remove latent execution failures designed into the
software than to rigorously design the
software to prevent execution failures.
For example, touch-typing is both more
reliable and productive than hunt-andpeck typing.
We believe - and experience to date
supports our belief- that as software developers move from today’s heuristic p r e
gramming to rigorous software engineering, quality will increase and design and
development costs will decrease.
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Table 1.
Selectedsample of Cleanroomprojects.
(All other projects known to authorsreport substantial improvements in quality and productivity.)
Year

Applied
technologies

Implementation

Results

1980

Stepwise refinement
Functionalverification

Census,25 KLOC (Pascal)

No failure ever found
Programmer received gold medal
from Baldridge

1983

Functional verification
Inspections

Wheelwriter, 63 KLOC,
three processors

Millions of users
No failure ever found

1980s

Functionalverification
Inspections

Space shuttle, 500 KLOC

Cleanroom engineering

Flight control, 33 KLOC (Jovial) ,,
three increments

1987

Low defect over entire function

No defect in any flight
Work received NASA’s QualityAward
Completed ahead of schedule

2.5 errors/KLOC before any execution
Error-fixeffort reduced by a factor of five

1988

Cleanroom engineering

Commercial product, 80 KLOC (PL/I)

Certification testing failure rate
of 3.4 failures/KLOC
Deployment failures of O.l/KLOC
Productivityof 740 lines/man-month

1989

Partial Cleanroom
engineering

Satellite control, 30 KLOC (Fortran)

Certification testing error rate
of 3.3 failures/KLOC
50-percent improvement in quality
Productivityof 780 lines/man-month
80-percentimprovement in productivity

1990

Cleanroom engineering
with reuse and new Ada
design language

Research project, 12KLOC
(Adaand ADL)

Certified to 0.9978with 989 test cases; 36
failures found during certification (20
logic errors, or 1.7 errors/KLOC

Myth: Unit vmjicatim by debugging works
on system ofany siz.
Unitverification- debugging -is best
done by a single programmer who exercises the program with specially constructed test cases. During debugging, the
programmer constructs test cases, develops programs to run isolated units of the
system,runs the tests, and fixes discrepancies as they are observed. This process
continues until the programmer is satis
tied the program performs its intended
mission.
Fact: Although it is satisfactorywhen the
software product is small,unit verification
by debugging does not scale up. When the
product is large and unit verificationexercises only a small portion of the total system, the results are not satisfactory.
Debugging doesn’t scale up because it
often compromises the design’sintegrity.
Typically, software units are built according to a sound design and fit together according to the design when unit debugging begins. But the fixes introduced
during debugging,while they may seem to
make individual modules perform their
intended mission fully, cause design faults
when the fixed modules are combined.
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These failures are then either found during integration testing or left in the product as latent failures.Debugging seems to
produce local correctness and global incorrectness.
Ed Adams examined every failure report for nine of IBM’s most widely used
software products for several years and
traced each to its origin. He found that in
most cases the cause of the failure was introduced during an attempt to fix another
failure.’
Fact: Unit verification by logical argument does scale up. This method of unit
verification is based on the time-tested
method of proving the correctness of an
assertion by developing a proof. A p r e
gram specification is a function or relation; a program of any size or complexity
is a rule for a function. So all you have to
do to show the correctnessof a program is
to show that it is a complete rule for a s u b
set of the specification.
Experience indicates that using proof
arguments to show program correctnessis
not an academic curiosity that works on
small problems -it is a robust technique
that works well on large, complex systems.
Table 1 summarizes data for a few proj-

ects that used unit verification by logical
argument. All our experience with this
method indicates that the scaleup p r o b
lem associatedwith debuggingis very tractable. Unit verificationby logical argument
seems to work because when a defect is
found in a proof argument the focus can’t
shift to local concerns to make something
work - the argument focusesentirely on
global issues.
Fact: Unit verification via logical argument is more cost-effective than unit verification via debugging, for four reasons:
Design errors are caught sooner and
as a result are less costly to fix.
It eliminates the expense of finding
the subtle, hard-to-fixfailures introduced
by debugging.
It eliminates the expense of building
programs to permit unit testing and preparing unit test cases.
Surprisingly,it takes less time.
Do we really mean that unit tests should
not be conducted? Yes. Unit testing is
done to demonstrate that the unit satisfies
its specification.We believe you can better
demonstrate this with logical arguments.
So ifwe don’t test units, then what do we
test and when? The answer to that ques-
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tional verification, leaving only simple errors like syntax oversightsto be found durMyth: The only way to p e r f m unit umjica- ing execution testing.
Many engineers find the mental chaltion via logical argument is to use a computer
lenge of functionalverificationmore stimprogram.
Researchers have investedsignificantef- ulating and Satisfying than debugging.
9 Many engineers find the team style B
fort into building programs that use axiomatic arguments to verify programs. sociatedwith functional verificationmore
These programs, as of now and for the satisfjmg than the solo style associated
foreseeable future, can verlfy only small with debugging.
9 Engineers can learn how to perform
programs using a limited number of language constructs. Developers have not unit verification via functional verificabeen able to scale up axiomatic verifica- tion.
Engineers performing functional verition programs even with today’s very fast
fication leave significantly fewer failures to
computers.
Fact: Engineers can verify large pro- be found during later lifecycle phases
grams made up of many language con- than debuggers. Data indicates that funcstructs with functional verification. Func- tional verification leaves only two to five
tional verification,introduced by Richard futes per thousands lines of code to be
Linger,Harlan Mills,and Bernard Witt,3is made in later phases: compared to 10 to
quite different from axiomatic verification.
Coverage testingis as
With functional verification, you struclikely to find a rare
ture a proof that a program implements
its specification correctly. Again, if a proexecution failure as it is
gram specification is a function then a
a frequentone. Usage
program is a rule for a function. The
testingthatmatchesthe
proof must show that the rule (the p r e
actual usage profile has
gram) correctly implements the function
abetterchamoffinding
(the specification)for the full range of the
the execution failures
function and no more.
Linger, Mills, and Witt have developed a
that
fiequentlF
correctness theorem that defines what
must be shown for each of the structured
programming language constructs. The 30 fixes left by unit testing by debugging!
Engineers practicing functional verifiproof strategy is divided into small parts,
which are easily accumulated into a proof cation complete the total development
for a large program. Our experience indi- process with significantly less effort than
cates that people can master these ideas those practicing unit verification via deand construct proof arguments for very bugging. Measurementsindicate that the
improvement in productivity may be
large programs.
The first reaction of many people is that three to five times!
it must be hard to construct a proof that a
Myth: Software is best tested by designing tests
program is correct. Our experience indicates that, with a modest amount of train- that covereverypath through theprogram.
This testing method, called coverage
ing and the opportunity to use the ideas
on the job, people can learn to develop testing, requires that the test developer be
proof arguments and talk to other engi- completelyfamiliar with the software’sinneers in terms of proofs.
ternal design.
Fact: Statistical usage testing is 20 times
Linger: Mills,’ Richard Selby,’ and others have analyzed the performance of soft- more cost-effective in finding execution
ware engineers using functional verifica- failures than coverage testing (a claim we
tion to perform unit verification via will prove later).
In statisticalusage testing, the test devellogical argument. Among their observaoper draws tests at random from the p o p
tions:
ulation of all possible uses of the software,
9 Engineers find logic errors with function involvesanother myth.

occur
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in accordance with the distribution of expected usage. The test developer must understand what the software is intended to
do and how it is expected to be used. The
test developer then constructs tests that
are representative of expected usage. No
knowledge of how the software is designed and constructed is required.
Fact: Users observe failures in execution. While developers talk of finding and
fixing errors or faults, users don’t observe
errors or faults. They observe execution
failures, which occur when the software
doesn’t do something it’s required to do.
When a tester observes an execution
failure, the software is searched for a way
to prevent it. As a result of the search,
changes are made to the code that may or
may not fix the failure and mayor may not
introduce new latent failures. The modifications are counted to obtain a count of
software errors or faults.
For example, if you change five areas of
the program because they were apparently doing something they shouldn’t be
doing, we say that five errors have been
found and fixed. Software failures are precise while software errors are imprecise. It
is execution failures that must be found
and eliminated from software.
Some execution failures will occur frequently, others infrequently. Coverage
testing is as likely to find a rare execution
failure as it is afrequent execution failure.
Usage testing that matches the actual
usage profile has a better chance of finding the execution failures that occur frequently.
Therefore, since the goal of a testing
program should be to maximizeexpected
mean time to failure, a strategy that concentrates on the failures that occur frequentlyis more effectivethan one that has
an equal probability of finding high- and
low-frequency failures.
Myth: It doesn’t matter how mm orfailures
arefound, as longas thq mejxed.
Fact: The failure rates of different errors can vary by four orders of magnitude
in complex systems. To measure the increased effectivenessof usage testing over
coverage testing, you need to know the
frequency of rare failures versus frequent
failures in a population of programs
under test. The Adams study contains one
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Table 2.
Software failures for nine major IBM products, classifiedfrom rare to frequent.
Rare
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

1,580

500

158

50

15.8

5

1.58

1

34.2

28.8

17.8

10.3

5.0

2.1

1.2

0.7

2

34.3

28.0

18.2

9.7

4.5

3.2

1.5

0.7

3

33.7

28.5

18.0

8.7

6.5

2.8

1.4

0.4

4

34.2

28.5

18.7

11.9

4.4

2.0

0.3

0.1

5

34.2

28.5

18.4

9.4

4.4

2.9

1.4

0.7

6

32.0

28.2

20.1

11.5

5.0

2.1

0.8

0.3

7

34.0

28.5

18.5

9.9

4.5

2.7

1.4

0.6

8

31.9

27.1

18.4

11.1

6.5

2.7

1.4

1.1

9

31.2

27.6

20.4

12.8

5.6

1.9

0.5

0.0

33.4

28.2

18.7

10.6

5.2

2.5

1.o

0.4

0.008

0.021

.044

0.079

0.123

0.187

0.237

0.300

M m F (years)

Average percentage
failures
Probabilityof a failure
for this frequency

large database we can use to estimate increased effectiveness.
Table 2 summarizes Adams’s data,
which has been classified across columns
by the frequency that a some user found a
failure? Each row represents a major IBM
system like M V S , Cobol,and IMS. The columns represent a subdivision of the frequencyin which users observed afailure.
For example, the first column represents failures observed by users on the average of once every 5,000 years of usage;
the last column represents failures o b
served by users on the average of once
every 1.58 years of usage. The data in each
cell defines the percentage of all failures
observed for the software system represented by that row with the expected frequency represented by that column. The
values in each row sum to 100.
The remarkable fact is that, over this
very divergent range of products, the d i s
tribution of failures occurring with different frequenciesis uniform. This letsus use
the data for analysis.
The bottom two rows of Table 2 contain
two numbers for each failure frequency,
the average percent failuresfor the group
and the probability of a failure of the frequency represented by that group. An examination of these last two rows provides
some critical insights. Groups 1 a n d 2,
which represent failures that will be o b
served less than once in 1,580years of ex-
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Frequent

5,000

Group
Percent failures
in class for product

.

pected use, account for 61.6 percent of
fixes made but only for 2.9 percent of the
failures that will be observed by typical
users. On the other hand, groups 7 and 8
represent only 1.4 percent of the fixes
made to the software but eliminate 53.7
percent of the failures that would be o b
served by a typical user.
If you use coverage testing, you would
spend 61.6 percent of the testing and correction budget on finding and futing errors that will eliminate only 2.9 percent of
the failures, and only 1.4 percent on making fixes that would eliminate 53.7 percent of failures. Coverage testing doesn’t
appear to very effective at allocating the
testing and correction budget to increase

M m .
On the other hand, a usage testing strategy allocates the budget in accordance
with the probabilitythat afailure is observable by the average user: It allocates 53.7
percent to fixes that will occur 53.7 percent of the time in the experience of an
average user.
Using the data in Table 2, we can show
that usage testing is 21 times more effective at increasing MTTF than coverage
testing. Let Pbe the increase in MTTF o b
tained by the next fix determined by coverage testing. Then the increase in MTTF
obtained by the next fix determined by
usage testing will be:

((0.008/60) + (0.021/19)+ (0.044/6) +
(0.079/1.9)+ (0.123/0.6)+ (0.187/0.19) t
(0.237/0.06) + (0.30/0.019))P= 20.98 P

This surprising result suggests the prevailing strategyfor testing and correcting
software is very inefficient.

Myth: Software behavior is deterministic.
Therqie, statistics cannot be used to make infmences about sofiare quality.
Fact: Software use is stochastic. A software system has many different uses to
perform different missions starting from
different initial conditions and given different input data. Each different use is a
different event. Given a system that contains some latent failures, some usages will
result in a failure; others in a correct execution. If you sample the entire population of all possible usages in accordance
with an expected usage profile and maintain a record of failures and success, you
can use statistics to estimate reliability.
Fact: You can estimate the expected
M’ITF for a system from a series of tests
drawn at random in accordance with an
expected usage profile from the population of all possible uses. The major a s
sumption you must make to make the statistical estimation valid is that the
development process is in a state of control. This is not an unreasonable assump
tion - it is the same one made when statistical quality-control practices are
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applied to a production process.
While our experience in applying statistical quality-control techniques to software development is limited, initial experience indicates t h a t five fixes per
thousand lines of code can be tolerated
without invalidatingthe applicationof statistics to estimate MTTF. This failure rate
is low compared to normal development
practices, where 20 to 60 fixes per thousand lines of code is not atypical.
Fact: Experience indicates that it is p o s
sible to design and develop software that
requires less than five fixes per thousand
lines of code from its first compilation
throughout its useful life. The engineering practices that let such quality be
achieved before any execution testing are
grouped under the heading “Cleanroom
engineering.”
Myth: The solutim to the development Fob
lem is to create tools that willdoforpeople what
thq can’t dofol themselves.
The general idea behind this myth is
that people can’t be trusted to make the
difficult inventionsthat software develop
ment requires.
Fact: Automation is very effective in
helping us do the things we already know
how to do. We know how to write. Aword
processor helps us write faster, but it
doesn’t help us write better (except that it
gives us more time to think).
A translator - a compiler - can trans
late a high-level language definition into
machinelevel instructions. For example,
compilers translate a Fortran or Cobol
program into machine language. While
this translation algorithm can be performed by people or computers, computers have an advantage because, once they
have been programmed to do it, they are
fast and reliable and can free people to do
something else.
Fact: Automation is not effective in
helping us do things we don’t know how
to do algorithmically.When we computerize incomplete algorithms,the results are
incomplete and unsatisfactory. When
database management systems were first
introduced, hierarchical and network
databases were common. Database management programs encountered failures
that were eventually traced to a common
set of problems which E.F. Codd named
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data-maintenanceabnormalities.
These abnormalities, which cost business a great deal in terms of wrong decisions and software fixes,were caused by a
basic failure in the hierarchical and network database models. These models
could not maintain the referential transparency between the actual data and the
state data used to represent it in computations:In certain situations,the value of the
state data did not accuratelyrepresent the
actual data as stored in the database.
Codd’s relational algorithm does maintain referential transparency, and if it is
used to maintain keys in a relational
database,it eliminatesthese failures.
This should have been an important lee
son learned, but apparently the lesson was
lost, because loss of referential transpar-

Tools are only asgood as
the ideas that serve as
their found#ion. The
important m
o
rin
selectingdesighand
development tools is to
select the ideas you want
to use to help gUide the
inventive process.

ency is still a common design flaw. The
current generation of computer-aided
software-engineeringtools does not help
maintain referential transparency and in
some cases even allows designs that do not
exhibit referential transparency.
For example, some CASE tools help you
invent program structures by converting
dataflow diagrams into program structures. Due to the one-to-many relationship between a dataflow diagram and a
program-structure chart, it is easy to lose
referential transparency between the his
tory of stimuli to the software and the state
data used to represent the stimuli histories.
Fact: Ideas must precede tools.Toolsare
only as good as the ideas that serve as their
foundation. The important factor in selecting tools to assist in software design

and development is to select the ideas that
youwant to use to help guide the inventive
process. Once that is done then the ideas
can be organized into an engineering
process that helps people exploit the c h e
sen ideas. Then it is possible to select or
build tools that enhance peoples’ productivity in performing these ideas.

Cleanroomengineering
These ideas are the foundation for the
set of softwareengineering practices we
call Cleanroom engineering?
Cleanroom engineering can help software engineers implement reliable software - software that won’t fail during
use. Cleanroom engineering
achieves intellectual control by applying rigorous, mathematics-based engineering practices,
establishes an “errors-are-unacceptable” attitude and a team responsibility
for quality,
delegates development and testingresponsibilitiesto separate teams, and
certifies the software’sMTTF through
the application of statistical quality-control methods.
Process. Cleanroom engineering involves a specification team, a develop
ment team, and a certification team. The
specification team prepares and maintains the specification and specializes it
for each development increment. The development team designs and implements
the software. The certification team compiles, tests, and certifiesthe software’scorrectness.
In the Cleanroom engineering, the
team members
complete a rigorous, formal specification, even if it is preliminary, before they
begin design and development,
*develop a construction plan by decomposing the specification into small
(seldom more than 10,ooO lines of thirdgeneration code) user-executable increments,
design, implement, and verify each
user-executableincrement, and
assess the software’squality.

Typical project. Figure 1 shows a profile
of a typical Cleanroom engineering project, divided into phases.
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Problem analysis and requirements phases

specification

Construction
Planning

t

t
Certify
increment 1

I

1

1

Design and build
increment 2

Test preparation for
increments 1 and 2

Solution
deployment
I

I

I

F i r e 1.Profile of a three-incrementCleanroom-engineeringproject.

S,beciJicution.The first task is to assemble
what is known into a specification document, complete the remaining details,
then prepare and publish aformal specification. The first version may be preliminary due to lack of information, but it
should still be formal. The specification
must be as complete as possible and a p
proved before development begins.
The effort required to prepare the specification depends on how much is known
when the decision to develop the software
is made. It should be in three parts, which
should agree: external specification, internal specification, and expected-usage
profile.
The external specificationis a user’sreference manual. It defines how the software will look and feel from the user’sperspective and all the interfaces with the
software. The specification should include details on
the system environment (hardware,
peripherals, operating system, related
software, and people),
the application environment (data
and use structures),
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initialization and shutdown,
system use (commands, menus,
events, and modes), which must define all
stimuli the system can receive from p e e
ple, computers, and other devices and all
responses it will produce,
performance guidelines (timing and
precision), and
responsesto undesired events.
The external specificationiswritten in a
language understood by users, but it is not
a tutorial. It is not designed to instruct
how to use the software; it is intended to
define precisely how the software will
work. Using only the external specification, someone with appropriate application expertise should be able to use the
software with no surprises.
The internal specificationis more mathematical. It completely states the mathematical function or, more generally,mathematical relation for which the program
implements a rule. This definition is required to implement the program and
verlfy its correctness. It must be implementation-independent so the program
architecture can be designed free of pre-

conceptions.
The internal specification augments information in the external specification.
For example, while the external specification defines the stimuli the software will
act upon and responses it will produce,
the internal specification defines the responses in terms of stimuli histories. Specifylng the functional relationship between
responses and stimuli completelyin terms
of stimuli histories avoids commitment to
implementation details.
Speclfylng responses this way is usually
hard to learn at first because it is natural to
use invented abstractions- state data to represent some portion of the prior
stimuli. But as soon as you use state data to
define software responses,you begin making implementation commitments.
At the specification stage, you must define what is to be done, not how to do it.
Experience indicates that as soon as you
learn to define what is to be done free of
implementation details, you can design
and implement much better software.
(David Parnas recommends traces8) We
find using stimuli histones more conve-
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nient and natural and therefore easier to tion plan, including the first, be executable by user commands. This means both
teach.
The expected usage profile defines the that the system must be constructed topsoftware’santicipated use. This document down and that you need write no special
primarily guides the preparation of usage testing routines.
It also means that incremental integratests. To make a valid inference about the
software’s expected M‘ITF, you must de- tion testing is done as each new increment
velop and run tests with stimuli taken is written. And it lets you use all test runs,
from the population of all possible stimuli including the tests on the very first increand in the same proportion as they will be ment, to help estimate the final MTTF.
Figure 2 shows a sample construction
generated when the system is in use.
Statistical testing is a stochastic process. plan.
When you have decomposed the specifiThe simplest and best understood s t e
chastic process is the Markov process, cation into increments, design, implewhich can model the usage of most if not mentation, and testing can begin. These
all software systems. In developing a Markov model for expected use, you must deYour specificationmust
fine all usage states and estimate the trandefine what is to be done,
sition probabilities between usage states.
This sounds harder than it seems to be in
not how. Btpedeme
practice. For example, see Jesse Poore’s
indicates that as soon as
work?
you leam to define what
There is no magic in preparing the writis to be done free of
ten specification. The magic is inventing
implementation details,
what the software should do to accomplish its mission - a much deeper and
you can create much
harder problem than developingthe softbetter software.
ware. That is why it is so important to use
good engineering practices in developing
software so the time and attention now two phases can proceed in parallel.
being consumed on the easy part of the
problem can be redirected to the harder
Design and build. The development
problem of determining what the soft- team, not an individual engineer, is reware should be doing.
sponsible for the qualityofthe increments
developed.The team uses technologiesto
Construction plan. This phase deter- construct increments, box structures and
mines the development and certification stepwise refinement, and functional verisequence. To do this, you decompose the fication. Development proceeds in three
specification into executable increments. steps:
An executable increment can be tested by
1. Design each increment topdown, to
invoking user commands or supplying create a usage hierarchy in three views:
other external stimuli.
black-box, state-box,and clear-box.Venfy
The criteria to determine the construc- the correctnessof each view.
tion sequence include
2. Implement each increment by rigorthe availabilityof reusable software,
ous stepwise refinement of clear boxes
how much is known about the reliabil- into executable code.
ity of the reused software for the expected
3. Verify that the code performs acusage profile,
cording to its specification using funcincrement size (incrementsshould sel- tional verificationarguments.
dom be larger than 10,OOO lines), and
the number of development teams
Box structures. The team uses box strucavailable,which determines the possibili- tures to create the software’s internal deties for parallel development.
sign. Box structures view the software
Incremental development is not new. from three perspectives:
The important new idea is the requireThe implementation-independent
ment that each increment in the construc- black-box view defines the responses in
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terms of stimuli histories.
The data-driven state-boxview begins
to define implementation details by modifying the black box to represent responses in terms of the current stimuli
and state data that represents the stimuli
histories.
The processdriven clear-box view
completes the implementation details by
modifylng the state box view to represent
responses in terms of the current stimuli,
state data, and invocations of lower level
black boxes.
Some advocate the dataview,others the
processviewfor designingsoftware.These
different points of view cannot be resolved because, in reality, both views are
required. Box structures let you define
this dualism.
Figure 3 summarizesa design algorithm
defined by Mills that uses box structures.’0
The first black box restates the specifcation that defines all the responses p r e
duced by the increment in terms of stimuli histories.
Steps 3 through 5 invent the state data
that represents stimuli histories, to preserve referential transparency. The alge
rithm then determines which of the state
data to maintain at this level of the usage
hierarchy and which to migrate to a lower
level. It is important to migrate state data
to the lowest practical level in the usage
hierarchy to keep the software’sstructure
under control.
The state-box description is complete
when functional relationships exist that
define the responses in terms of the current stimuli, the state data being maintained at this level, and stimuli histories
for the state data being maintained at
lower levels.
Before the team proceeds to define the
clear box, it verifies the state-box descrip
tion by eliminating references to state
data in the state-boxfunctions.The result
is a derived black-box function that
should be the same as the original blackbox function.
If the two functions are the same, the
team definesthe clear box that follows the
state box, otherwise it redefines the statebox function to correct the design errors.
So the design process is suspended as long
as the design contains logic errors.Just as
in long division,it is best to fix any error as
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Increment
development
barn A

Increment
1

Increment
2

Increment
3

Team B

Increment
4

scenarios

Increment

Increments
1 and 2

1

Certify
statistical
usage
testing

I

’

Increment

Increments
1,2,and3

I

Increments
1,2,3, and 4

Increments
1 and 2

Increments
1,2, and 3

Increments
1,2,3, and 4

I

Fire 2.A t y p i c a l Cleanroom project constructionplan.

I

I

Define
Black Box

1. Define stimuli.
2. Define responses in terms of stimuli histories.

Define
State Box

3. Define state data to represent stimulihistories.
4. Select state data to be maintained at this level.
5. Mod* black box to represent responsesin terms of stimuli
and the state data being maintained at this level.
6. Venfy state box.

Define
Clear Box

I

7. Record type of reference to state data by stimuli.
8. Define data abstraction for each state data.
9. Modify state box to represent responses in terms of stimuli,
this level’sstate data, and invocations of lower level black boxes.
10. Verify the clear box.

a lower level. After step 10 you have a
chance to evaluatewhich lower level black
boxes to invoke.
The algorithm doesn’t make the invention in these two crucial areas for the development team, but it does ensure that
all the details following these two inventions are performed correctly with the
verification steps. The algorithm also
forces the designers and evaluators to
focus on the critical software inventions
that affect software performance and
quality.
The box-structures algorithm is a process that engineers and managers can rely
on to invent a high quality,accuratedesign.

Figure 3.The box-structuresalgorithm.

soon as possible. It takes less time in the
long run.
To design the clear box, the team invents (selects) the data abstractions (like
set, stack, and queue) it will use to represent the state data maintained at this level.
Then it modifies the state-boxfunction to
define responses in terms of current stimuli, state data being maintained at this
level, and invocationsof lower level black
boxes.
When the clear box description is complete, it is verified by eliminating references to lower level black boxes to obtain
a derived state-box function that is compared to the original state-boxfunction.
If the original and the derivedfunctions
are the same, the design process contin-
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ues. Otherwise, clear-box design continuesuntil the verification indicatesno logic
errors.
The design process continues as the
team expands each black box until there
are no more to be expanded. At that point
the design is complete.

Stepwise refinement. Box structures provide a rigorous stepwise refinement algorithm that guides system design in an
orderly, logical manner, with natural
checkpoints along the way. For example,
after step 6 in Figure 3 it is time to evaluate
which state data you want to be maintained at this level. This gives you a chance
to evaluate the trade-offs in maintaining
the state at this level versus migrating it to

Functional ueri$cation. Once the design is
complete, the team expands the clear box
at each level into code that fully implements the defined rule for the black-box
function at that level. Following each expansion, the team uses functionalverifcation to help structure a proof that the expansion correctly implements the specification.
The proof must show that the rule (the
program) correctly implements the function (the specification)for the full range
of the function and no more. The Linger,
Mills, and Witt correctness theorem3 defines what you must show to prove that a
program is equivalent to its specification
for each of the structured-programminglanguage constructs.
The proof strategy is divided into small
parts that easily accumulate into a proof
for a large program. Experience indicates
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that people are able to master these ideas
and construct proof arguments for very
large software systems.
The Cleanroom development team
does not test or even compile the code. It
uses a mathematical proof - functional
verification-to demonstrate the correctness of the units. Testing and measuring
failures by program execution is the responsibilityof the certification team.

Table 3.
Results of MTTF estimation.
Version
number

Observed
MTTF

Predicted
reliability

Predicted
MTTF

1 .oo

-

-

-

6.00

-

-

-

0.59

___

~~

1 .OO

.23

.81

16.00

.77

4.38

1.36

232.62

3.60

560.00

Certification. In parallel with the development team, the certification team uses
the expected-usage profile and the applicable portion of the external specification
to prepare test cases and solutionsthat exby fitting the data points To,... , Tkto an
ercise the increment just developed and
exponential relationship. The reliability
the increments developedpreviously.The
can
be calculatedfrom the MlTF. The reteam can perform this step in parallel with
sults of the MTI'F estimation can be sumdevelopmentbecause it uses the specificamarized in a table, as in Table 3, which
tion, not the code, to develop tests.
summarizesdata from an actual project.
When the developmentteam completes
During certification, the team should
an increment, the certification compiles
observe the dynamics of change to deterit, adds it to previous increments, and cermine how many more tests are required to
tifies the software in three steps:
term the software to the required MTI'F.
1. It measures Tk,
the MTI'F of the cur- B is the factor by which each change inrent version of the software by executing creases the MTTF. If B goes below 1, the
random test cases. Tkis a sample of MTTF new version is worse than the previousverfor a version of the accumulated incresion. It is desirable that the value of B inments and To, ..., Tkl (measured precrease monotonically.
viously).
The value of Bturns down when failures
The team compares each test result to a are encountered late. Failuresfound early
standard; either the result is correct or are not expensive in terms of eventually
there was afailure. The cumulativetime to obtaining a high value for MTTF with a
failure is an estimate of the MTTF. The reasonable testing budget, but if B drops
team may decide to continue testing by late in the certification process it will take
constructing more tests. The new time to a large number of tests to achieve the defailure is another estimate of the MTI'F. It sired MTTF. M'ITF, reliability, and testing
uses all estimates of h4TTF to predict the time (number of test cases) are matheMTTF of the next version.
matically related to each other. The team
The certification team reports failures can also calculate confidence bounds on
to the development team, which makes MTI'F estimates.
the fixes. When the development team re3. Once it has estimated the m F for
turns new modules, the certification team the next version, the team must decide if it
compiles a new version, and the measur- wants to
ing process is repeated for the new version
correct the observed failures and conof the software.
tinue to certify the software,
stop certification because the software
2. Estimate the reliability for the next
version of the software using a certifica- has reached the desired reliability for this
tion model and the measured MTI'F for stage of testing, or
stop certification and redesign the
each version of the software. The team
predicts the MTTF for the next version of software because the failure rate is too
high or the failures are too serious.
the software using the model
When all the increments are complete
MTTF, + , =A@' '
and tested, you have a reliable estimate of
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Factor
B

.9957

the software's quality and it can be deployed.
While we don't address the operations
and maintenance phases here, we want to
point out that
operations provide actual testing for
continued estimates of the MTTF to
check against what has been certifiedduring development and
the maintenance phase will be much
simpler for Cleanroomdeveloped software than for heuristicallydeveloped software because of higher qualityand the existence of a design and developmenttrail.

Goals. We believe the following are realistic goals for Cleanroom engineering.
Our belief comes from observingdemonstrations of component practices, including a few demonstrations of the full set of
practices. Table 1 summarizes the results
of some of these projects.
Long-term goals (after a team has
completed three or four increments): two
orders of magnitude (factor of 100) improvement in reliability and one order of
magnitude (factorof 10)improvementin
productivity.
Short-termgoals (first two or three increments developed by a new Cleanroom
team) : statistical quality control of development in a pipeline of user-executable
increments that accumulate into a system;
elimination of debugging by software engineers before independent statistical
testing of usage requirements; certifiication of reliability at delivery; one order of
magnitude improvement in reliability;
and factor of three improvement in p r e
ductivity.

53

~-

R

esponsible softwaredevelopment organizations should
begin to adopt Cleanroom engineering or some equivalent discipline.An organization always faces riskswhen it
decides to change the way it does business. The best way to manage risk is to identify the risk and determine what actions to take
to avoid it or at least minimize its effect.
The potential gains &om Cleanroom engineering are enormous compared to the identifed risks. The largest risk an organization can take is to decide not to adopt Cleanroom engineering or an equivalent discipline. At the very least, organizations
should conduct a trial on at least one or two significantprojects.
The cost of continuing to develop failure-laden software with
its associated low productivity can at best increase cost and at
worst so affect an organization’scompetitiveposition that is difficult to remain in business.
Organizationsthat purchase software should also understand
the ramifications of Cleanroom engineering so they can work
with their vendors and integrators to ensure that they build highqualitysoftware at an attractive price. Intelligent buyers can have
a significant effect on the speed with which developers adopt
these superior softwaredevelopment practices.

.:.

Wgs Your Last
Software Project
Late?
If your last software project was late, you need Costar,a software cost
estimation tool that will help you plan and manage your n a t project.
Costar is based on the COCOMO model described by Bany Bwhm in
SoftwarnEngineeting Economics.

COCOMO is used by hundreds of software managen to estimate the cost,
staffing levels, and schedule required to complete a project-it’s reliable.
repeatable. and accurate.
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